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INTRODUCTION
Although a great many voices have been raised in the debate
over ethical questions in the biotechnology arena, over the issue of
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sex-selection practices1 there is a disquieting silence in the United
States. How is that silence to be accounted for? With the advent of
technologies capable of profoundly expanding reproductive options and
changing the very concept of reproduction itself, one might fully expect
an outcry for regulation. Yet, sex-selection practices are virtually un-
regulated in the United States at both the federal and state levels, and
there has been relatively little demand for such regulation.2
In fact, the United States is one of the few remaining countries
that still allows non-medical sex selection.3 Both the United Kingdom4
and Canada5 have significant pieces of legislation addressing sex
selection as well as a number of other areas concerning reproductive
technology.6 Members of the Council of Europe have banned sex
selection for non-medical purposes entirely.7 In some places, sex-
selection practices actually have criminal consequences. Of these,
Germany and the Australian state of Victoria have some of the most
1. Sex selection practices are methods, either preconception or prenatal, that allow for
parental selection of the gender of the child. See infra Part I (discussing the various sex-
selection technologies).
2. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effect of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 429 (1990); See, e.g.,
Margaret Foster Riley & Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Reproductive Genetics: A Review
of American Bioethics Commissions and Comparison to the British Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Authority, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (noting a Senate
report stating that it is not “the responsibility of the Federal government to develop and
establish moral principles”).
3. Susannah Baruch, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental Preferences:
Beyond Deadly Disease, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 245, 267 (2008). See also S. Soini,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PDG) in Europe: Diversity of Legislation a Challenge
to the Community and its Citizens, 26 MED. & L. 309, 314 (2007) (examining the European
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’s explicit ban on non-medical sex-selection
practices found in article 14, which states “that ‘[t]he use of techniques of medically
assisted procreation shall not be allowed for the purpose of choosing a future child’s sex,
except where serious hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided’ ” (quoting Council of
Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine art. 14, Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No.
164, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 817)).
4. See Press Release, Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, HFEA announces
sex selection recommendations (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/803.html (stating
that the British population exhibited “overwhelming support for sex selection techniques
to be regulated,” support that ultimately led to the United Kingdom’s ban on non-medical
sex selection practices in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008).
5. See Colin Rasmussen, Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Is it Scientific
Censorship, or a Reasoned Approach to the Regulation of Rapidly Emerging Reproductive
Technologies?, 67 SASK. L. REV. 97, 97-99 (2004) (discussing Canada’s proactive response
to the reproductive-biotechnology debate: approval of the Assisted Human Reproduction
Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.)).
6. This legislation will be discussed in greater detail in Part V, when this Note ex-
amines the Canadian and British legislation as potential models for the United States.
7. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1624
(2008).
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severe penalties.8 Germany’s 1990 Embryo Protection Act9 makes non-
medical sex selection a criminal act with a penalty of up to one year’s
imprisonment,10 and Victoria’s Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act
of 200811 makes non-medical sex selection a criminal offense for which
individuals may face up to two years’ imprisonment as penalty.12
There are a number of possible explanations as to why there has
been relatively little debate on this issue in the United States. The
rhetoric of “choice” supporting abortion rights may explain some of the
disparity between the United States and other countries, or at least
explain why feminists have not been at the forefront of the debate.13
It is also possible that the issue has simply been ignored under the
mistaken assumption that sex selection is not a pressing concern in
the United States.14 Demographic data, however, suggest otherwise.15
Politicians themselves may be reluctant to enter into the debate
because it is simply not politically advantageous to do so—these issues
are too politically divisive.16 Politicians are aware that they would
likely have to address the status of embryos, an area of political dis-
course that frequently leads to a stalemate, with both sides often
refusing to compromise their ideals, as has happened with the issue
of abortion rights.17
It is true that sex selection is more prevalent and presents a
greater threat in other parts of the world, particularly in Asian
countries such as China and India.18 Yet because these areas account
8. Edgar Dahl, Boy or Girl: Should Parents Be Allowed to Choose the Sex of Their
Children?, CARDIFF CTR. FOR ETHICS, LAW & SOC’Y, 1 (2005), http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk
/archives/publications/2005/dahlpaper.pdf.
9. Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG] [Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13,
1990, BGBL. I at 2746 (Ger.).
10. Id. § 3.
11. Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic.) (Austl.).
12. Id. c. 28.
13. See Mallika Kaur Sarkaria, Comment, Lessons From Punjab’s “Missing Girls”:
Toward a Global Feminist Perspective on “Choice” in Abortion, 97 CAL. L. REV. 905, 939
(2009) (“[T]he hard-won ‘right to choose’ has enough detractors without feminists them-
selves questioning its appropriateness . . . . The difficulty of applying ‘choice’ to sex-
selective abortions provides ammunition to anti-abortion activists in the United States.
Anti-abortion activists argue that sex selection is yet another ugly aspect of abortion.”).
14. See Nicholas Eberstadt, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly
Third Committee: The Global War Against Baby Girls (Dec. 6, 2006), AM. ENTER. INST.
FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH, at 28 (noting that in the United States, although there is the
tendency to think that sex selection is not a major concern, there is real data showing
the contrary).
15. See id. at 27-28 (discussing the demographical trends in the United States towards
sex selection).
16. Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 321 (2008).
17. Id. at 322-23.
18. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9-12.
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for approximately forty percent of the world’s population,19 a response
by the United States is all the more necessary. Silence on this issue
sends a message of complicity to the world. It has become increasingly
important to address sex selection, because more and more couples
from other countries are coming to the United States for sex-selection
procedures to which they are denied at home.20 In fact, the United
States has been called “the ‘Wild West of reproductive technology.” 21
Sex selection is quickly becoming a multimillion-dollar industry in the
United States alone,22 an industry that must at least be acknowl-
edged, if not regulated, by government. There is also concern that if
fertility clinics continue to offer ethically questionable procedures
without any oversight, the public’s overall trust in the fertility field
may be threatened.23
In Part I, this Note will provide a brief explanation of the different
methods available for sex selection. Part II of this Note will provide a
thorough examination of demographic data concerning sex selection
and its effects, both globally and within the United States. Part III
will examine the underlying ethical issues raised by sex selection. Part
IV will look specifically at the feminist dilemma concerning reproduc-
tive rights and sex selection. Lastly, Part V will examine two potential
models for the United States: Canada24 and the United Kingdom,25
along with alternatives to governmental regulation. As for alternatives
to regulation, Part V will examine the possibility of using professional
19. Monica Sharma, Twenty-first Century Pink or Blue: How Sex Selection Technology
Facilitates Gendercide and What We Can Do About It, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 198, 200 (2008).
20. Baruch, supra note 3, at 267.
21. Sharma, supra note 19, at 206 (quoting Suzanne Leigh, Reproductive Tourism, USA
TODAY, May 2, 2005, at 7D). See also Garrison, supra note 7, at 1623.
22. Sharma, supra note 19, at 198.
23. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Pandora’s Progeny: Ethical Issues in Assisted Human
Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 745, 771 (2005); Bratislav Stankovic, “It’s a Designer Baby!”:
Opinions On Regulation of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH.
3, ¶ 27 (2005).
24. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
25. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). Note that this Act has
been amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008, which put into
statute the ban on non-medical sex selection that was previously in place only as a matter
of policy. The regulatory scheme outlined in the 1990 Act remains intact. Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (Eng.). See also Explanatory Notes to Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, ¶ 50 (Eng.) [hereinafter Explanatory Notes]
(“This provision enables sex selection not only for conditions which are clearly linked to sex
chromosomes . . . but also where there is a particular risk of gender-related conditions for
example . . . breast cancer where the mother . . . wishes to avoid passing this condition on
to a daughter.”). This is actually somewhat of a more lax standard for sex-selection
practices, as, previously, the more controversial use of sex selection for the prevention of
the birth of a daughter who was a carrier of an X-linked recessive gene was generally not
approved. Soini, supra note 3, at 314.
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societies that issue guidelines as a means to monitor, and ultimately
curb, sex-selection practices in the United States.26
This Note ultimately concludes that neither model would be a
good choice for the United States, due to the models’ various shortcom-
ings as implemented in those countries,27 and because they would be
ill-suited as a federal model for oversight and regulation in the United
States.28 Moreover, there are serious questions as to whether these
models of regulation could withstand constitutional scrutiny.29 There-
fore, while efforts must be made to address the issue of sex-selection
practices, federal regulation would be the least appropriate or desir-
able response.30 Relying instead on professional societies to issue
guidelines and standards, as well as to use extensive efforts to pro-
mote education and awareness, is the best possible option.
26. See Susannah Baruch et al., Genetic Testing of Embryos: Practices and Perspectives
of U.S. IVF Clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1053, 1057 (2008), available at http://www
.dnapolicy.org/resources/GeneticTestingofEmbryos.pdf (“A substantial majority of clinic
directors surveyed agree or strongly agree that professional societies are best suited to
create professional guidelines related to PGD and that they should do so.”).
27. See Amel Alghrani & Margaret Brazier, 16 MED. L. REV. 469, 471 (2008)  (reviewing
RUTH DEECH & ANNA SMAJDOR, FROM IVF TO IMMORTALITY: CONTROVERSY IN THE ERA OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2007)) (quoting the House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee calling the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s policy
development “highly unsatisfactory”); Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 97 (noting that the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act ultimately “is flawed in that it tries to cover too much
legislative ground”).
28. See Alison Harvison Young, Possible Policy Strategies for the United States:
Comparative Lessons, in REPROGENETICS: LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 226, 226 (Lori
P. Knowles & Gregory E. Kaebnick eds., 2007) (arguing that the “broad, national
regulatory framework like that provided by the British Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) or . . . the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, is unlikely to
be an effective or politically viable approach in the U.S. context”).
29. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 3.
30. See COLIN GAVAGHAN, DEFENDING THE GENETIC SUPERMARKET: THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF SELECTING THE NEXT GENERATION 132 (2007) (noting that the prohibition by law
of sex selection is probably doing more harm than good to women in India). A logical
extension of this idea is that the same would be true of certain ethnic subgroups in the
United States, particularly the groups that demographers have demonstrated are the most
likely to use sex-selection practices. See Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 1 (setting forth the
idea that there is a “global war against baby girls”); Part II, infra (discussing sex-selection
figures); see also Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942 (“Rather than focusing on forcing women
to make the ‘right’ choice, cultural change campaigns should focus on expanding choices.
Rather than punishing women for making the ‘wrong’ choice of sex selection, they should
ensure that it is not the only choice for women.”). Again, although the article is speaking
out against governmental regulation or criminalization of sex selection in India, the same
principle should be emphasized with respect to ethnic groups in the United States. Finding
the balance between regulating sex selection and not punishing women for exercising their
“right to choose” is the task undertaken in this Note. It is important for the United States
to have a loud voice in what ultimately needs to be a global cultural discussion on sex-
selection practices for there to be for any real change.
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SEX-SELECTION PRACTICES
Sex selection can be achieved in a number of ways. The focus of
this Note will be on the first two methods discussed, preimplantation
genetic diagnosis and sperm sorting, but it is important to bear in
mind all of the methods used for sex selection when considering the
significance of this issue and the appropriate responses to it.
A. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD, involves egg extrac-
tion, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and the selection of embryos for trans-
fer back to the woman’s uterus.31 PGD was originally developed for use
by families that had known sex-linked genetic diseases in an effort to
screen embryos for the disease before transfer and implantation.32
Today, this technology is also being used for sex selection.33
In 2005, forty-two percent of IVF-PGD clinics reported providing
non-medical sex selections in PGD cycles.34 Forty-seven percent of
these same clinics stated that they “are willing to defer to parental
preferences and provide PGD for nonmedical sex selection under all
circumstances.” 35 Infertility patients have expressed a fairly strong
interest in preimplantation sex selection if there is no additional cost
to them.36 This technology is still relatively expensive. The American
Society for Reproductive Medicine stated that, in 2008, the average
cost of an IVF cycle in the United States was $12,400, while PGD cost
as much as $10,000 to $12,000 per cycle.37
Several European countries have reacted to the expansive use of
PGD, either through a total ban on the practice, or by limiting its use
to medical sex selection only.38 Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, and
Austria have completely banned its use,39 while France, Greece, Hol-
land, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom have limited
its use to medical purposes only.40
31. Baruch, supra note 3, at 247.
32. Id. at 248.
33. Riley & Merrill, supra note 2, at 58.
34. Baruch et al., supra note 26, at 1056.
35. Id. at 1057.
36. See Sharma, supra note 19, at 199 (discussing a 2005 study that found that forty-
one percent of infertility patients would use preimplantation sex selection if there was no
additional cost for the procedure, and that half of that group would still use sex selection
even though it had to pay).
37. Baruch, supra note 3, at 251.
38. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 50.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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B. Sperm Sorting
MicroSort,41 or sperm sorting,42 is the newest development in
sex-selection technology.43 It is both a less costly and less intrusive
alternative to PGD.44 Used before conception, MicroSort is a tech-
nique that separates sperm that is likely to produce boys from that
which is likely to produce girls.45 Intrauterine insemination (IUI) is
then used to insert the sperm likely to create the desired sex.46 Al-
though MicroSort is more affordable than PGD,47 MicroSort’s proba-
bility of conceiving a child of the desired sex is lower: ninety-two
percent of parents who requested a female baby ended up with a
female baby, and eighty-one percent of parents who requested a male
baby ended up with a male baby,48 compared to the near-perfect
success rate of PGD.49 Like PGD, the primary medical purpose of
sperm sorting is to allow couples with a known risk of a sex-linked
genetic disease or disorder to select the sex of their child to avoid
passing on the sex-linked trait.50
Although some commentators consider the ethical or moral issues
to be the same for PGD and sperm sorting, others are far less comfort-
able with the use of PGD for sex selection.51 For example, commenta-
tors recognize that while one technique, sperm sorting, merely in-
creases the likelihood of a certain sex, the other, PGD, is nearly 100
percent effective.52 In addition, Jeffery Kahn, the Director of the
Center for Bioethics at the University of Minnesota, argues that
“ ‘[s]orting sperm is one thing–it’s quite another to create and test
embryos before they are implanted in a woman’s womb and discard
those of the ‘wrong’ gender, at least for many professionals and
41. Dahl, supra note 8, at 1. This procedure is sometimes referred to as flow cytometric
sperm separation. Id. at 2.
42. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1639. For a more thorough discussion of the science of the
sperm sorting process, see Ethics Comm. Of the Am. Soc’y of Reproductive Med., 
Preconception Gender Selection for Nonmedical Reasons, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 861, 861
(2001) [hereinafter Ethics Comm.].
43. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
44. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 861.
45. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
46. Id.
47. Dahl, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that each attempt to artificially inseminate the
woman costs approximately 1,250 British pounds); Garrison, supra note 7, at 1639.
48. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
49. Jason Christopher Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 12, ¶ 18 (2002).
50. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
51. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 18.
52. Id.
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members of the public.’ ” 53 Sperm sorting thus remains a particu-
larly controversial method of sex selection.
C. Selective Termination of Pregnancies Based on Sex and
Infanticide
There are methods that are even more controversial for selecting
sex. Parents may also have the option of selectively terminating a
pregnancy once the sex of the fetus is known, a practice that is wide-
spread in China (and other Asian countries) and India, in particular.54
Although such practices have already revealed that female fetuses are
the target of selective abortions in these countries, sociological polling
on birth-order preference suggests that because a son is universally
preferred to a daughter as a first child, female fetuses are those most
likely to be the targets in any location.55
Scholar Nicholas Eberstadt, in an address before the United
Nations in 2006, reported the startling statistic that, “[a]t the very
minimum, half of all second-order (or higher) female pregnancies in
China are terminated on a gender-selective basis.” 56 Additionally,
infanticide, or the killing of the child after birth,57 is still practiced if
the child is not of the desired sex, and is most common in South Asia
and India.58 This practice almost exclusively results in the death of
female babies.59 One study reported that out of 8,000 abortions per-
formed in India, 7,999 were on female fetuses.60 Shockingly, female
infanticide has only been outlawed in India since 1996.61 Yet, clearly,
the practice is still widespread.62
II. FIGURES AND DATA IN THE UNITED STATES AND GLOBALLY
Demographers have reported some startling figures that reveal a
disturbing trend toward sex selection in the pursuit of male children
53. Id. (quoting Jeffery P. Kahn, The Questionable Future of Unregulated Reproduction,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/02/18/ethics.matters/index.html).
54. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9-12.
55. Lynne Marie Kohm, Sex Selection Abortion and the Boomerang Effect of a Woman’s
Right to Choose: A Paradox of the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 91, 93 (1997).
56. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 7. See also Sheila A.M. McLean, Sex Selection:
Intergenerational Justice or Injustice?, 24 MED. & L. 761, 766 (2005) (discussing China’s
“notorious one child policy” that leads to the abortion of female fetuses and the infanticide
of female children).
57. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 14.
58. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9, 23.
59. Id.; Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
60. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 15.
61. Id. ¶ 14.
62. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 23.
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across the globe.63 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has
reported that forty-three million females are missing from India’s
population.64 In 2001, the city of Punjab’s male-to-female ratio was 127
boys for every 100 girls.65 Economist Amartya Sen has similarly esti-
mated that around fifty million women are missing from Chinese
population figures.66 Demographic reports from South Korea, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan, and from Chinese ethnic groups in Singapore, also
reflect equally disturbing male-to-female ratios.67 Data have also re-
vealed alarming sex ratios in many other parts of the world, including
countries in Latin America and Europe.68
It is clear that, on a global scale, sex selection is having a pro-
found effect on populations–namely on the male-to-female ratio.69 Yet
proponents of “choice” in sex selection tend to dismiss the claims about
unbalanced sex ratios because they do not believe the imbalance is of
real concern in the United States or other Western societies.70
Nevertheless, the numbers in the United States reveal that we,
too, are not immune to this trend, particularly within certain ethnic
subgroups.71 Chinese-American, Japanese-American, Filipino-Ameri-
can, and other Asian-American populations exhibit the most disquiet-
ing sex ratios at birth.72 Most alarming of these is the Japanese-
American ratio, which rose from 99.7 boys to every 100 girls in 1975
to 108.9 boys to every 100 girls in 2002.73 Thus, as some commentators
have observed, allowing sex selection could introduce into American
society inequality along ethnic lines, as well as along gender lines.74
It is important to bear in mind the prevalence of sex-selection
practices globally and domestically, as well as the potential effect of
63. Id. at 9, 23; Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
64. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200 (noting also that even the Indian government, in its
2001 census, reported the odd figure of only 927 girl babies for every 1,000 boy babies).
65. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 13. This creates “the biologically impossible sex ratio
of 110 to 100.” Id.
66. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
67. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See Dahl, supra note 8, at 3-4 (“[A] readily available service for preconception sex
selection . . . is highly unlikely to cause a severe imbalance of the sexes in Western
societies.”); McLean, supra note 56, at 767 (“[E]vidence suggests that the spectre of 
demographic disaster is in fact a red herring.”).
71. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 27.
72. Id. Further, “the odds against seeing the[se statistics] reported by Asian-American
communities as an artifact of pure chance would rise into the tens of billions.” Id. at 28. See
also Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 26 (noting that ethnic groups composed of immigrants from
the Asian subcontinent and China “are on the rise,” and that they “have a tradition of
overwhelmingly favoring male offspring”).
73. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 27.
74. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 26.
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these practices on demographics, when considering sex-selection reg-
ulation or alternatives to regulation. The issue has been too long
ignored in the United States, perhaps because there is little recogni-
tion of the startling data concerning population imbalances and the
aborting of female fetuses and killing of female babies.
III. BEYOND DEMOGRAPHICS: THE ETHICS OF SEX SELECTION
Although demographic data may alone suffice in demonstrating
that sex selection needs to be addressed, the number of pressing moral
and ethical concerns in the sex-selection debate present compelling
arguments that the issue needs to be addressed now. Commentators
on both sides of the issue, and particularly those against sex selection,
speak about sex selection in heated tones. Some feminist commenta-
tors go so far as to claim that sex-selection technology “could mean the
death of the female.” 75 Several commentators have termed the word
“gendercide” to describe the disproportionate effect of sex-selection
technology on women.76 Those who do not condemn sex-selection prac-
tices emphasize the importance of reproductive autonomy and ques-
tion whether the arguments advanced against sex selection are of
sufficient weight to justify limiting reproductive autonomy.77 Indeed,
as philosopher Mary Anne Warren has stated, “the value of freedom
‘cannot easily be overridden by the mere possibility of harmful ef-
fects—even rather significant ones.’ ” 78 Proponents of this position
point to the fact that although law, social practice, and ethics do not
necessarily view procreative liberty as absolute, individuals are ordi-
narily given substantial latitude in reproductive matters.79
There is also the important argument that in any pluralistic
society there are always irreconcilable differences on certain moral or
ethical issues, and that, in those cases, there ought to be a “presump-
tion in favor of liberty.” 80 Professor Julian Savulescu makes the
point: “‘[i]t is easy to grant people the freedom to do what is agreeable
to us . . . [but] freedom is important only when it is the freedom for
75. Robyn Rowland, Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of ‘Choice’
in Sex Preselection, in MAN-MADE WOMEN: HOW NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
AFFECT WOMEN 74, 75 (Gena Corea et al. eds., 1987).
76. Sharma, supra note 19, at 199.
77. GAVAGHAN, supra note 30, at 128. See Stephen Wilkinson, Sexism, Sex Selection and
‘Family Balancing,’ 16 MED. L. REV. 369, 370 (2008) (discussing the view of some that
preserving the “‘free market’” in sex selection trumps concerns about “the wrongness of
‘playing [G]od’”).
78. McLean, supra note 56, at 769 (citation omitted).
79. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862.
80. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
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people to do what is disagreeable to others.’ ” 81 Coupled with this idea
are the principles that “[e]ach citizen should have the right to live his
life as he chooses so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of
others,” 82 and that “[t]he state may interfere with the free choices
of its citizens only to prevent serious harm to others.” 83 While these
may be valid assertions, many of the opponents to sex selection claim
that the more compelling argument is that “[s]election somehow vio-
lates the child’s ‘right to an open future,’ ” 84 so these “free choices”
do, in reality, cause serious harm to others.85 Opponents of sex
selection, therefore, argue that the state does have a legitimate right
to intervene.86
A. “Family Balancing” Through Sex Selection
Perhaps the most defensible use of sex selection for non-medical
reasons is for so-called “family balancing.”87 Parents may have a legiti-
mate interest in “evening things up [by] reducing or eliminating the
sex differential” within the family.88 There is some fairly persuasive
evidence that in Western nations, couples with two boys or two girls
are more likely to have a third child than families with only one child
of each, leading to, perhaps, a fair conclusion: parents who do not have
children of both sexes are attempting to “balance” their family with a
third child of the “missing” gender.89 This assertion is supported by
data collected from the Gender Clinic in Fairfax, Virginia showing
that more than ninety percent of couples who are seeking sex selection
for non-medical reasons are parents who already have two or more
children of the same sex and are attempting to have a child of the
opposite sex.90
“Family balancing,” then, may be more defensible than other non-
medical forms of sex selection because it is presumably less likely to
be a sexist process continually favoring males over females, which is
one of the primary concerns voiced by opponents of sex selection.91 The
argument is that, in “family balancing,” the focus is on achieving
81. McLean, supra note 56, at 769 (citation omitted).
82. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
83. Id.
84. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 374 (citation omitted).
85. See Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862 (noting several of the potential harms of
sex selection to children and society in general, including increased marital conflict).
86. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1640.
87. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 371.
88. Id.
89. Dahl, supra note 8, at 3.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 370-71.
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gender balance, rather than on having a child of a particular sex, so it
may be less likely that there are sexist motives at play.92 This argu-
ment is not particularly strong, though, as the “balance” desired by the
parents may have more to do with traits or assumptions about a par-
ticular sex, such as wanting children who are aggressive and who
have “sporting prowess,” 93 than with the actual biological sex.94 In that
case, parents are engaging in sexist stereotyping just as much as any
other parents using sex-selection methods for non-medical reasons.95
Thus, although motivations for sex selection “may vary, by definition
there are no non-sexist reasons for sex selection except in cases of pre-
venting sex-linked diseases.” 96
B. Ethical Considerations of Sex Selection and the Bounds of Re-
productive Choice
A number of the most significant ethical concerns of sex selection
were addressed in the American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s
2001 Ethics Committee Report, including: “the potential for inherent
gender discrimination, inappropriate control over nonessential charac-
teristics of children, unnecessary medical burdens and costs for par-
ents, and inappropriate and potentially unfair use of limited medical
resources.” 97 Other concerns include “psychological harm to sex-se-
lected offspring . . . and reinforcement of gender bias in society as a
whole.” 98 There also exists the oft-cited “playing God” concern99 and
the question about whether such meddling is “unnatural.” 100 Each of
these objections deserves attention.
C. Inherent Gender Discrimination
The argument for inherent gender discrimination in sex selection
is relatively clear: parents will select sex based on certain assumptions
about appropriate or expected gender behaviors, thus inevitably
92. Id. at 384. See also McLean, supra note 56, at 765 (noting that “Dickens has argued
that ‘[p]rohibitions are unnecessary and oppressive where there is no sex bias but only a
wish to balance a family with children of both sexes. . . .’ ” (quoting B.M. Dickens, Can Sex
Selection be Ethically Tolerated?, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 335, 336 (2002))).
93. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 388.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 26.
97. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 861-62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
100. Id.
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fostering discriminatory gender stereotypes.101 Underlying sex-selec-
tion decisions is the idea that “one sex is superior to, or more appropri-
ately suited for certain social tasks.” 102 Coupled with this idea is the
argument that the psychological well-being of the sex-selected child
will be at stake, as the child will likely “be expected to act in certain
gender-specific ways when the technique succeeds and who may
disappoint parents when it fails.” 103 There is also always the possi-
bility that a “misdiagnosis” will lead to the birth of a child of the
“undesired sex,” in which case the child might then suffer due to
“parental disappointment.” 104
Professor Rosamund Scott challenges the claim that sex-selection
practices are not discriminatory, even in nations that “show ‘no signifi-
cant overall preference for one sex over the other.’ ” 105 She argues that
even though there may not be an overall preference for one sex in a
given society, individuals certainly do have preferences.106 To dem-
onstrate her point, she contrasts a society in which there is no
racism with a society in which fifty percent of the population dis-
criminates against black people and fifty percent discriminates
against white people, concluding that the former society is the
better society in which to live, even though the ratios in the latter
society are ultimately even.107
She then asks and answers in the affirmative whether prefer-
ence for one sex over the other is the same type of discrimination
and raises the additional point that society may, in fact, be condon-
ing inherent gender discrimination by allowing non-medical sex
selection.108 This is the exact concern expressed by those opposing
non-medical sex selection.
D. Inappropriate Control of Nonessential Characteristics of
Children
Opponents also note that the inappropriate control of nonessential
characteristics of children is another ethical concern.109 “Essential
characteristics,” although not a particularly well-defined term, seems
101. Maneesha Deckha, (Not) Reproducing the Cultural, Racial and Embodied Other:
A Feminist Response to Canada’s Partial Ban on Sex Selection, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1,
15-17 (2007); Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 385, 388.
102. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 385.
103. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862.
104. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 38.
105. ROSAMUND SCOTT, CHOOSING BETWEEN POSSIBLE LIVES: LAW AND ETHICS OF
PRENATAL AND PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS 320 (2007) (citation omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 320-21.
109. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 861-62.
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to be limited in scope to traits connected to “clinical expressions of dis-
ability or disadvantage.” 110 This includes selecting sex to avoid sex-
linked diseases, which seems to be generally accepted.111
The World Health Organization (WHO) has a broader definition
of “health,” which includes an affirmative right to both mental and
social well-being, rather than just a right to the absence of disease or
disability.112 Some have invoked this definition to argue that the realm
of “essential” characteristics should perhaps be expanded to traits that
could affect the child’s mental and social “non-clinical” health as
well.113 The extension of “essential” characteristics would be problem-
atic, though, for those who question the use of genetic screening even
for genetic disorders because they fear that allowing screening and
testing of fetuses for sex-linked diseases could lead to unfair discrimi-
nation against people with disorders.114 Their primary concerns are
that the dignity and human value of people with disorders will be
questioned,115 and that terminating fetuses with these disorders will
“send[] a message that a life with the disability is not worth living at
all.” 116 In response to this point, some commentators call attention to
the important distinction between the actual disability and people
with disabilities, noting that while “[s]election reduces the prevalence
of the former, [it] is silent with respect to the value of the latter.” 117
E. Limited and Scarce Medical Resources for Nonessential
Purposes
Tied to the argument against control over nonessential character-
istics of children is the idea that sex-selection practices would deplete
110. McLean, supra note 56, at 764.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Soini, supra note 3, at 316.
115. Deckha, supra note 101, at 16; Soini, supra note 3, at 316. Soini includes several dif-
ferent views regarding this argument. For example, Soini contrasts the idea that select-
ing an embryo for its desired health involves a valorization of human nature and  the life
worth living with the WHO’s statement that ultimately “ ‘knowledge-based, goal-oriented
individual or family choices to have a healthy baby do not constitute eugenics . . . .
Eugenics is directed against whole populations, whereas the work of today’s clinical
geneticists is directed towards individuals and families.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
116. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 13. See also Deckha, supra note 101, at 16 (describing how
sex-selection practices “send a discriminatory and demoralizing message to persons already
living with disabilities that it would have been better for all concerned had they not been
born”).
117. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 13. (emphasizing that “ ‘it would be a drastic step in favor
of equality to inflict a higher risk of having a child with a disability on a couple . . . to
promote social equality. . . . To attempt to prevent accidents which cause paraplegia is not
to say that paraplegics are less deserving of respect’ ” (quoting Julian Savulescu, Procreative
Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413, 423 (2001))).
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valuable and already scarce medical resources for nonessential medi-
cal purposes.118 The obvious counter-argument is that, as a free soci-
ety, we already allow for many nonessential medical procedures.119
Cosmetic surgeries, such as face-lifts and liposuction, are clear exam-
ples.120 Thus, even if these sex-selection practices were to have some
aggregate downward effect on scarce medical resources, in a society
that accepts non-medical cosmetic surgeries, “one could not, without
calling [the entire] system into question, condemn a practice merely
because it uses medicine for lifestyle or child-rearing choices.” 121
F. Concerns about the “Slippery Slope” and the Creation of
“Designer Babies”
Opponents of sex selection also invoke the “slippery slope” argu-
ment: allowing parents to select for the sex of their children will open
the door to so-called “designer babies,” so that parents will be able to
select several of the nonessential characteristics of their children, such
as hair or eye color.122 There is a general concern that allowing for sex
selection or any other “designer” options may “turn[] the process of
having child [sic] into a consumer experience, giving it a measurable,
commodified value.” 123 Some believe that an inevitable consequence of
this “consumer experience” will be the substantial and inappropriate
emphasis placed on a child’s genetic make-up, rather than on the
child’s “inherent worth.” 124
Professor Dahl disagrees, ultimately concluding that the creation
of “designer babies” is an unfounded concern.125 He states that the
arguments against sex selection are not actually against sex selection,
but rather, “against its alleged consequences.” 126 He also argues that
“[i]t is perfectly possible to draw a legal line permitting some forms of
selection and prohibiting others.” 127 Finally, he concludes that he does
not envision devastating social effects resulting from this sort of par-
ental control: if “some parents [are] foolish enough to spend their
hard-earned money on genetic technologies just to ensure their child
118. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 16; Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862.
119. Dahl, supra note 8, at 3; Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 863.
120. Dahl, supra note 8, at 3.
121. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 863.
122. Dahl, supra note 8, at 4.
123. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 34.
124. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862. There is also a strong argument that an
increase in genetic testing in reproductive matters could lead to an entirely new under-
standing of parenthood, wherein genetic ties are emphasized over other forms of familial
relationships. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 38.
125. Dahl, supra note 8, at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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will be born with big brown eyes and black curly hair. . . . I cannot
see that this would herald the end of civilization as we know it.” 128
IV. THE FEMINIST DILEMMA
Feminists unquestionably face a dilemma when confronted with
sex-selection practices. Abortion and reproductive rights are arguably
at the core of feminism and women’s rights.129 Yet sex-selection prac-
tices, which can be perceived as merely an extension of reproductive
rights, simultaneously implicate a number of additional significant
gender and feminist issues.130 As discussed above, women are dispro-
portionately the targets of sex selection, and there is a significant
argument that sex selection leads to the furtherance of gender stereo-
types and inherent gender discrimination.131 As one commentator has
noted, “[t]he conflict between preserving reproductive autonomy and
ending gendercide is, of course, quite problematic. Resolution of the
issue will require intensive effort and political acumen.”132 It is of the
utmost importance, then, that the feminist voice and, more generally,
the female voice, contributes to the discussion.
A. The Rhetoric of “Choice” and the Western Liberal Conception of
Reproductive Rights
One of the dilemmas underlying the feminist position in the
United States with respect to sex selection is the rhetoric of “choice”
surrounding abortion and reproductive rights.133 Since Roe v. Wade134–
the case in which the Supreme Court first recognized a woman’s right
to not be denied an abortion (during the first two trimesters of her
pregnancy)135–the emphasis has been on the fact that it is the woman’s
choice to control her pregnancy.136 The term “pro-choice” is now en-
trenched in the feminist vernacular: feminists and women who sup-
port abortion rights identify themselves as “pro-choice.” 137
This rhetoric of “choice” has pervaded all reproductive areas, in-
cluding sex-selection practices, to the detriment of feminists and
128. Id. at 4-5.
129. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 905.
130. See supra Parts II, III (discussing sex selection’s disparate impact on females and
promotion of inherent gender discrimination).
131. Id.
132. Sharma, supra note 19, at 204.
133. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 907-08.
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. Id. at 164; Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 937.
136. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 937.
137. Id.
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women who might otherwise speak out against sex selection.138 As one
commentator notes, applying the “choice” paradigm to sex selection
creates a potential double standard: some reproductive choices given
to women, such as aborting a fetus for reasons other than sex selec-
tion, are acceptable, yet other reproductive choices, such as aborting
a fetus as a means of sex selection, are not acceptable.139
The feminist emphasis on personal autonomy and reproductive
choice has manifested itself in interesting ways. The 1985 Wertz study
revealed that female doctors may actually be substantially more
comfortable performing sex-selection procedures than male doctors.140
The study showed that “ ‘U.S. women [doctors] were twice as likely as
men to say that they would perform sex selection, usually out of re-
spect for patient autonomy.’ ”141 Women are understandably hesitant
to undermine the “hard-won ‘right to choose’ ” and the procurement
of reproductive autonomy in the wake of sex-selection choices.142 In
fact, they may be the strongest advocates of providing such autono-
mous choices.143
Several commentators discuss the problem with framing repro-
ductive rights as choice-based and suggest that perhaps there is an
alternate approach that would be less problematic to feminists and
women in general.144 These commentators agree that “choice” is often
a delusion, especially in non-Western societies, but also in developed,
liberal societies.145 For example, the reproductive justice movement
acknowledges that many women do not have real “choice” due to
racial, economic, physical or social constraints.146 Even women in lib-
eral societies may also feel these same pressures, including pressure
from male partners to engage in sex selection.147
The “choice” paradigm, then, is somewhat misleading, in that sex-
selection “choices” are often “less an expression of a woman’s individ-
ual ‘choice’ for what is best for herself and more her response to the
pressures created by” society.148 Interestingly, even in the wake of a
recognition of reproductive rights such as abortion, there was initial
feminist opposition to the practice, based on the idea that abortion did
138. Id. at 939 (“ ‘What was once hailed as the choice that would free all women has come
to shackle the future of women as a gender.’ ” (quoting Kohm, supra note 55, at 96)).
139. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 940.
140. Kohm, supra note 55, at 111.
141. Id. (citation omitted).
142. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 939.
143. Id.
144. Kohm, supra note 55, at 125.
145. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 940-41.
146. Id. at 940.
147. Kohm, supra note 55, at 116.
148. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 941.
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not actually empower women, but, in fact, relinquished male respon-
sibility for pregnancy.149 The issue of “choice” within reproductive
autonomy has clearly never been a simple expression of a woman’s
autonomy in the sex-selection context,150 and so should not be treated
as such.
Some commentators believe that feminists, and women as a
whole, must work outside the paradigm of “choice” and individual
autonomy to create a position that works to the benefit of women
collectively.151 Expanding on this point, one commentator recalls the
philosophy of David Hume: “[p]ersonal liberty cannot be secured in sol-
itary subsistence, but only through a strong connection with a society
that respects and mutually protects that liberty.” 152 Noted feminist
Catherine MacKinnon has similarly “proclaim[ed] that feminist juris-
prudence is the analysis of law from the perspective of all women. All
women, if truly meant to be all inclusive, ought to mean all women
living, dead, and yet to live . . . .” 153 Feminists must, therefore, begin
to take into account the disparate impact sex selection has had, and,
undoubtedly, will continue to have, on the female population.
B. A New Feminist Perspective Not Based on a Binary “Choice”
Framework
Borrowing from MacKinnon’s view, perhaps the best possible
approach for both feminists and women more generally is a view that
does not focus on a binary right-or-wrong understanding of choice.154
The focus of the feminist contribution to the sex-selection debate
should not be on creating a regulatory structure that punishes women
for making the “wrong” choices.155 Instead, it should facilitate a greater
understanding of the significance of these choices and ensure that sex
selection is not the only option for women, particularly in cultures and
societies where the practice is widespread.156 One feminist commenta-
tor explains this approach best:
A woman pregnant with a female fetus does not respond to punish-
ment for her desire to have a son instead of a daughter, but might
149. Kohm, supra note 55, at 116.
150. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 940.
151. See id. at 940-41 (“The global feminist approach . . . stems from the belief that the
practical and philosophical difficulties that result from [using] . . . a rights-based frame
of reference can be overcome only by accepting that rights are discursively constituted.”).
152. Kohm, supra note 55, at 102.
153. Id.
154. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942.
155. Deckha, supra note 101, at 37; Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942.
156. Deckha, supra note 101, at 37-38; Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942.
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be encouraged to choose life for her daughter if she were given the
moral framework for valuing baby girls as much as she values
baby boys.157
V. REGULATORY OPTIONS AND NON-REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE UNITED STATES
A. Canada and the United Kingdom: Potential Models for the
United States?
Canada and the United Kingdom have responded to the growth
of sex-selection practices through legislative regulatory measures.158
Both countries’ measures offer a potential model for the United States,
and yet, both models ultimately fall short. Non-regulatory options,
such as the promulgation of professional guidelines and increased
emphasis on expanding choices for women and promoting education
and moral values, appear to be the best answers to the difficult ques-
tions that sex-selection practices present.159 Furthermore, professional
societies present less of a threat of limiting individuals’ personal liber-
ty, which is a concern of many who oppose sex-selection regulation.160
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act161 and the United
Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act162 both create a
national ban on sex-selection practices for non-medical reasons.163 The
Assisted Human Reproduction Act bans “any procedure . . . that would
ensure or increase the probability that an embryo will be of a particu-
lar sex, or that would identify the sex of an in vitro embryo, except to
prevent, diagnose or treat a sex-linked disorder or disease.” 164
England’s legislation had a similarly narrow allowance for sex se-
lection in 1990, but, in 2008, the scope was expanded to include “sex
selection not only for conditions which are clearly linked to sex
157. Kohm, supra note 55, at 118.
158. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.); Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (Eng.).
159. Not only is this choice best in a liberal society that values individual freedom, it also
works in conjunction with the feminist concerns discussed in Part IV.
160. See Dahl, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the importance of the “presumption of
liberty” in the political discourse of free societies when weighing reproductive rights).
161. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
162. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). Note that this Act has
been amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008, which puts into
statute the ban on non-medical sex selection that was supported by the HFEA’s Code of
Practice. Isabel Karpin & Roxanne Mykitiuk, Going out on a Limb: Prosthetics, Normalcy
and Disputing the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction, 16 MED. L. REV. 413, 434-36 (2008).
163. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 § 5(e) (Can.); Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (Eng.).
164. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2  § 5(e) (Can.).
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chromosomes . . . but also where there is a particular risk of gender-re-
lated conditions for example . . . breast cancer where the mother . . .
wishes to avoid passing this condition on to a daughter.” 165 The Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) issues licenses
for PGD, and does so on a case-by-case basis under these guidelines.166
As with any case-by-case decision-making process, the HFEA’s discre-
tionary method inserts a high degree of uncertainty into the reproduc-
tive-technology field. Bright line rules promulgated through either a
bureaucratic regulatory agency or professional societies would at least
provide greater legal clarity for parties interested in sex selection.
Commentators have found numerous flaws in both Canada’s and
the United Kingdom’s attempts to address the questions presented by
sex-selection practices and other reproductive technologies.167 The
Assisted Human Reproduction Act is criticized for “lag[ging] well
behind reproductive technology,” 168 as the Act was passed in response
to data contained in a report from the late 1980s.169 Others have voiced
concern that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act–and the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act for the same reason–is flawed in
that it does not prevent a woman who becomes pregnant naturally
or through artificial insemination from finding out the sex of the
fetus and then aborting the fetus if it is not the desired sex.170 They
claim, therefore, that the regulations only achieve a partial ban on
sex selection.171
Britain’s House of Commons Science and Technology Committee
has criticized the Act, stating that the HEFA’s policy development was
“highly unsatisfactory,” 172 and acknowledging that a number of aca-
demics believe that “the HEFA’s ‘conditions were arbitrary and
ethically muddled, and that overall the regulation . . . in the UK lacks
coherence and consistency.’ ” 173
Perhaps the greatest problem with bureaucratic regulation of new
technologies like the various sex-selection techniques is the inability
of such entities to respond to future changes in the technology174 or to
165. Explanatory Notes, supra note 25, ¶ 50.
166. Aaron R. Fahrenkrog, Note, A Comparison of International Regulation of Pre-
implantation Genetic Diagnosis and a Regulatory Suggestion for the United States, 15
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 757, 769 (2006).
167. E.g., Deckha, supra note 101, at 7; Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 128-31.
168. Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 128.
169. Id.
170. Deckha, supra note 101, at 7.
171. Id.
172. Alghrani & Brazier, supra note 27, at 471.
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 128 (arguing that this is one of the biggest prob-
lems with Canada’s Act).
2010] AN EXPLORATION OF THE “WILD WEST” OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 243
properly define terms used in the regulations.175 In its consultation
document, the Health Canada Assisted Reproduction Office uses the
“serious condition” standard to limit the use of sex-selection PGD, but
acknowledges that it is a difficult term to define.176 This inability to
define terms or create any bright line regulation, like the HFEA’s case-
by-case decision-making process, suffuses uncertainty into the repro-
ductive-technology field.
Further, the Brave New World report notes that patient “access
to PGD in Canada ‘is currently controlled by the medical profession,’ ”
where clinicians define for themselves what constitutes a “serious con-
dition.” 177 If this assessment is correct, then the bureaucratic regula-
tions may, in fact, be less far-reaching and effective than oversight by
professional societies. Professional societies would at least be com-
posed of members of the medical field who have the expertise and the
ability to promulgate more straightforward guidelines. Overall, with
several of these technologies being so new, any “attempts to draft regu-
latory guidelines may suffer from ambiguous or uncertain language.
[Yet d]espite the potential difficulty of interpreting words such as
‘serious,’ it and other similarly ambiguous words are commonly used
in regulatory guidelines . . . .” 178 As such, guidelines promulgated by
professional societies may be the better option for regulating sex-
selection practices.
B. Constitutional Considerations
Although these reasons alone may be enough to make Americans
wary of adopting a similar regulatory structure, there are also a num-
ber of constitutional issues surrounding any potential sex-selection
regulation adopted within the United States. There is certainly a
strong argument that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion,179 which has been held to include a right of privacy,180 encom-
passes the right to make all reproductive decisions, including those
regarding sex selection, free from government intrusion.181 Commenta-
tors have argued that making sex selection illegal could be seen as an
175. Fahrenkrog, supra note 166, at 769; Karpin & Mykitiuk, supra note 162, at 431.
176. Karpin & Mykitiuk, supra note 162, at 431.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Fahrenkrog, supra note 166, at 769.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
180. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law pro-
hibiting the use of contraceptives and aiding or abetting the use of contraceptives). The
Court described the protected interest in obtaining contraception as a “right of privacy.” Id.
at 486.
181. King, supra note 16, at 326. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (striking
down a Texas law banning abortion).
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invasion of privacy and a restriction of fundamental liberties.182
Furthermore, important Supreme Court decisions like Lawrence v.
Texas183 show that these commentators are perhaps correct in ac-
knowledging a “judicially recognized preeminence of personal auton-
omy” and an end of “morals legislation.” 184
To this point, leading voice on reproductive rights and liberty,
Professor John Robertson has argued that “procreative liberty extends
[even] to prebirth sex selection.” 185 Robertson claims that any decision
“ ‘centrally connected with reproductive choice’ ” should be within “the
sphere of protected procreative liberties.”186 Robertson also argues that
“ ‘[o]nly substantial harm to tangible interests of others should . . .
justify restriction.’ ” 187
Supporters of Robertson’s position argue that in a democratic
society there exists “a presumption in favor of liberty, including rights
to privacy and to procreative autonomy.” 188 A narrowly-tailored gov-
ernment regulation for which there is a “legitimate and significant
state interest” 189 might pass constitutional muster, and it is very likely
that any such regulation will face constitutional challenges, perhaps,
first and foremost, from women who see any attempt to regulate as an
abridgment of their reproductive rights and a threat to their reproduc-
tive autonomy. For feminists concerned about a state-authorized ero-
sion of abortion rights, then, professional societies may be the most
acceptable means of addressing sex selection.190
C. Professional Societies: The Best Option for the United States
Non-regulation in the form of guidance from or action by profes-
sional societies is perhaps the best option for the United States at this
time. In the first place, adding another layer of regulation might be
unwise because sex selection involves areas that already are engrossed
in a “complex web of regulation[],” namely genetic testing and assisted
182. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 9.
183. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
184. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 57. Although not directly pertaining to reproductive
choices, the case does support the argument that the notion that “[m]oral disapproval of a
group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause,”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring), may have application in the sex-
selection context.
185. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1625-26.
186. King, supra note 16, at 327.
187. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1625 (quoting JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 39, 41 (1994)).
188. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 20.
189. King, supra note 16, at 326-27.
190. See Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 939 (discussing the fact that the call for government
regulation of sex-selection practices would only provide fuel for anti-abortion activists).
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reproduction.191 Furthermore, no entity currently collects or is able to
provide comprehensive data about the use of these technologies within
the United States.192 Therefore, the first step should perhaps be col-
lecting data on the status of sex-selection practices within the United
States, which would provide a more complete picture when attempting
to define the interest in regulation of the industry.
Some commentators argue that “[t]he medical profession is far
better situated to self-regulate health practices, including the morally
debatable ones,” and that the government’s role should be limited to
“influenc[ing] and encourag[ing] the appropriate professional societies
to take action.” 193 Ninety-five percent of clinic directors surveyed in
2006 obviously agree, at least in the case of the use of PGD.194 It is also
significant that eighty-five percent of clinic directors recognize that the
current industry ought to have more professional guidelines regarding
PGD.195 These statistics indicate the willingness of clinics to adhere to
professional guidelines without the need for a bureaucratic regulatory
and penal structure.
Medical and professional societies such as the American Society
of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the Society for Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology (SART) could offer educational services and de-
velop regulatory guidelines for practice.196 Certainly the flexibility of
regulation through professional societies is hugely advantageous,
given the rapidly changing nature of the technologies.197 Although
professional societies do not have the power to criminally prosecute
members for non-compliance, the power to revoke a clinic’s member-
ship might be a powerful incentive for members to comply.198
Similarly, the educational services component of the professional
societies ought not to be dismissed, as creating a greater understand-
ing of the consequences of sex selection might make clinics a lot less
likely to offer or engage in such practices. Furthermore, expanding
knowledge and education for women should be a primary objective of
professional societies so that women have a framework for evaluating
their decisions and assessing their priorities.199 Ultimately there is a
191. Deckha, supra note 101, at 36-37.
192. Baruch, supra note 3, at 252.
193. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 55.
194. Baruch, supra note 26, at 1057. “Ninety-five percent of clinic directors agree or
strongly agree that professional societies are best suited to create standards and guide-
lines relating to PGD.” Id.
195. Id.
196. King, supra note 16, at 324.
197. Fahrenkrog, supra note 166, at 778. This particular author, however, does not think
this argument carries much weight. Id.
198. King, supra note 16, at 325.
199. See discussion supra Part IV (highlighting the conflict between preserving
“choice” and ending gendercide). This is an important objective from the feminist
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strong argument that professional societies, through a combination of
their expertise, flexibility, and ability to respond to rapidly changing
technologies, are capable of “more nuanced oversight” than is possible
through legislative regulation.200
CONCLUSION
With the advent of technologies capable of profoundly expanding
reproductive options and changing the very concept of reproduction
itself, it is imperative that the United States–“the ‘Wild West’ of repro-
ductive technology”–recognize its responsibility to provide leadership
in this field, both at home and abroad. The disquieting silence over the
issue of sex-selection practices must come to an end.
“Qui tacet consentit:” America’s silence sends a message of com-
plicity to the rest of the world. Most Americans would rightly be ap-
palled if the experience of bringing a child into the world were reduced
to a “consumer transaction,” with the child turned into a mere “com-
modity” through the use of sex-selection technology. Once a culture of
commodification is established, it will become ingrained in American
society, and resistance to it will begin to break down.
This relative silence over sex-selection practices in the United
States has come about for several reasons: an ignorance within the
general public of the realities of the practices; a reluctance on the part
of politicians to enter the debate in the political arena; and an unwill-
ingness among women, the group that suffers the most harm from
such practices, to speak out against sex selection for fear of losing
hard-won reproductive rights.
If the silence is not broken, the “Wild West” approach in which
sex-selection practices are virtually unregulated will yield grim re-
sults. The consequences of inaction are undeniable. Demographic data
clearly reveal the dangers of sex-selection practices; a resulting imbal-
ance of the male-to-female sex ratio is very much a reality. The first
step toward preventing this outcome is to acknowledge the frightening
realities of sex selection which threaten our world.
Other consequences of sex selection are perhaps more subtle, but
are equally problematic. There are significant arguments concerning:
the inherent sexist motivations of sex selection; inappropriate control
of nonessential characteristics of children; inappropriate use of scarce
medical resources on nonessential procedures; harmful effects on
children and the commodification of reproduction; and even the
perspective in that it seeks to expand choices for women without stringently limiting their
reproductive autonomy.
200. King, supra note 16, at 324.
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creation of a “slippery slope” leading to a world of “designer babies.”
Feminists have their own significant concerns about entering the
debate, given their long fight for reproductive autonomy. Yet perhaps
their voices ought to be the loudest: female babies, even in the United
States, will be disproportionately targeted by sex selection.
Throughout its history, America has had a gift for choosing self-
governance, on which real freedom rests, over government’s use of
force through regulation, which denies freedom. In light of this tradi-
tion, bringing an end to the “Wild West” approach would be best
served through action taken by professional societies, rather than
through government regulation. With a far greater capacity to under-
stand the rapidly-changing nature of biotechnologies than the govern-
ment, these professional societies have shown a willingness to lead,
something politicians clearly have not. That eighty-five percent of
clinics support the idea that there should be more professional
guidelines relating to PGD strongly attests to the willingness of
clinics to follow professional guidelines. This path, which rests on
winning over hearts and minds through education and building a
consensus, is to be preferred over having to resort to regulation
through bureaucracy. Finally, this approach to reproductive technolo-
gies is the one most in accord with the Constitution.
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